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1 Introduction
The standard economic approach to tax policy has to a large extent relied on wel-
farist theories of justice, in particular the utilitarian view that the government should
try to maximize the sum of individual welfare. This welfarist framework has proved
a productive point of departure for much economic analysis, but it has an important
limitation in its inability to take into account considerations of personal responsibil-
ity. Welfarist theories evaluate policies solely on the basis of their consequences for
individual welfare, and thus do not assign any intrinsic importance to how a specific
situation came about.
The inability to take account of personal responsibility implies that the welfarist
framework is unable to distinguish between different kinds of inequalities. By way of
illustration, the standard Pigou-Dalton principle of inequality aversion states that
the elimination of welfare inequality between two persons always is just, at least as
long as it does not contribute to a decrease in overall welfare. The disregard for
personal responsibility puts welfarist theories at odds with commonly held moral in-
tuitions. It is evident from the political debate, surveys (Gaertner and Schwettmann,
2007; Schokkaert and Devooght, 2003) and economic experiments (Cappelen, Drange
Hole, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2007; Cappelen, Mæstad, and Tungodden, 2010;
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Frohlich, Oppenheimer, and Kurki, 2004; Konow, 2000) that people view some in-
equalities, e.g. inequalities arising from differences in the number of hours worked,
as fair, and other inequalities, e.g. inequalities arising from gender or race, as unfair.
The intuition that it is necessary to distinguish between inequalities that individuals
are responsible for and inequalities that people are not responsible for is at the core
of liberal egalitarian theories of justice (Arneson, 1989; Bossert, 1995; Cohen, 1989;
Dworkin, 1981; Fleurbaey, 1995, 2008; Roemer, 1996, 1998).
In this chapter we discuss the implications of a liberal egalitarian approach to
tax policy and argue that such an approach avoids two fundamental challenges
faced by the standard welfarist approach to tax policy.1 We also argue that this
approach is able to capture the distinction between fair and unfair inequalities in
a way that the standard approach is unable to. A major challenge for the liberal
egalitarian approach to tax policy is that it requires information that typically is
unavailable to tax authorities in order to be implemented. We argue, however, that
this approach still can be used in the evaluation of tax policies. More specifically,
we present a framework for inequality measurement that allows for fair inequalities
(Alma˚s, Cappelen, Lind, Sørensen, and Tungodden, 2011). The defining feature of
this approach is that, for a given interpretation of the fair income distribution, it
measures how much the actual income distribution deviates from the fair income
distribution. We illustrate how this framework can be used to evaluate tax policy
analyzing the pre-tax and post tax income distribution in Norway from 1986 to
2005.
The paper proceeds as follows: Section 2 introduces the moral intuitions behind
the liberal egalitarian theories of justice and presents a specific principle of income
distribution that respects these intuitions. Section 3 discusses two dilemmas in
welfaristic tax policies, whereas Section 4 considers some important implications of
the liberal egalitarian view for optimal tax policy. Section 5 presents a generalized
version of the Gini-coefficient that measures unfair inequality and illustrates how
this measure can be used to evaluate policy. Section 6 provides some concluding
1See also the chapter by Marc Fleurbaey in this volume and Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006);
Fleurbaey (2008).
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comments.
2 What is the fair income distribution?
Liberal egalitarian theories of justice seek to combine an ideal of equality with an
ideal of personal freedom and responsibility. The contemporary focus on this re-
lationship can be traced back to the seminal work of Rawls (1971). The ideas of
Rawls have been developed further, notably by Arneson (1989); Bossert (1995); Co-
hen (1989); Dworkin (1981); Fleurbaey (1995, 2008); Roemer (1996, 1998), where
the main achievement has been to provide a more precise analysis of how consider-
ations of personal responsibility can be incorporated in egalitarian reasoning. The
dominating modern egalitarian view is that people, within a framework offering
equal opportunities and respecting personal freedom, should be held responsible for
their accomplishments.
A key feature of liberal egalitarian theories of justices is that they draw a dis-
tinction between responsibility factors and non-responsibility factors and argue that
inequalities arising from non-responsibility factors are illegitimate, whereas inequal-
ities arising from responsibility factors are considered legitimate. There are several
competing version of liberal egalitarian ethics and the purpose of this paper is not
to defend particular position. However, in order to fix ideas for the later discussion
and application of liberal egalitarianism, we present a specific responsibility-sensitive
fairness principle, the generalized proportionality principle. This principle, as de-
veloped in Bossert (1995), Cappelen and Tungodden (2010), and Konow (1996) can
be seen as a generalized version of the classical proportionality principle.
2.1 The generalized proportionality principle
To provide a precise formulation of the generalized proportionality principle we as-
sume that all factors that affect a person’s pre-tax income can be classified either
as a responsibility factor or as a non-responsibility factor. The pre-tax income of
an individual, i, can then be written as f(xRi ,x
NR
i ), where x
R
i and x
NR
i represent
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the vector of responsibility and non-responsibility factors for this individual, respec-
tively.
The generalized proportionality principle holds that an individual’s fair claim,
g(xRi ; ·), is given by what would have been the average income in a hypothetical
situation where everyone had the same responsibility vector as this individual,
g(xRi ; ·) =
1
n
∑
j
f(xRi ,x
NR
j ). (1)
Accordingly, individual i’s fair income, zGPPi , is proportional to his fair claim
relative to the other individuals’ fair claim,
zGPPi =
g(xRi ; ·)∑
j g(x
R
j ; ·)
∑
i
yi. (2)
where yi is the actual pre-tax income of an individual i. The generalized pro-
portionality principle treats all individuals as if they were identical with respect to
all non-responsibility factors. The principle can be said to be egalitarian because it
eliminates all inequalities arising from non-responsibility factors, i.e., unfair inequal-
ity. The generalized proportionality principle can also be said to be responsibility-
sensitive because it preserves inequalities that are only arising from responsibility
factors, i.e., fair inequality.
The generalized proportionality principle satisfies the classical minimal require-
ments of unfair inequality elimination and fair inequality preservation proposed by
Bossert and Fleurbaey (1996). First, any two individuals with the same responsi-
bility factors are assigned the same fair income. Second, in any situation where all
individuals have the same non-responsibility factors, each individual’s fair income is
equal to his pre-tax income.2
In sum, the generalized proportionality principle an attractive formalization
of a responsibility-sensitive fairness principle. There are also other responsibility-
sensitive fairness principles, such as the egalitarian equivalent principle, that satisfy
2A complete characterization of the generalized proportionality principle can be made based
on the strong requirement of fair inequality preservation and a rather weak requirement of unfair
inequality elimination (Cappelen and Tungodden, 2010).
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both the minimal requirement of unfair inequality elimination and the minimal re-
quirement of fair inequality preservation (Fleurbaey, 2008), but the discussion in the
rest of this chapter does not rely on the choice between these different theories. In
the application to Norwegian tax policy, we apply the generalized proportionality
principle, but the results are robust to using the egalitarian equivalent principle and
other reasonable formulations of this approach (Alma˚s et al., 2011).
3 Two dilemmas in tax policy
In this section, we discuss two dilemmas facing standard welfarist reasoning about
tax policy, namely the “exploitation of the energetic” and “the slavery of the tal-
ented”.
Consider first a situation in which all individuals in the economy face the same
hourly wage rate, but differ in their preferences and that they therefore choose to
work different hours. As a result of these choices the “energetic” person ends up
with a high level of income and the “lazy” with a low level of income. How should
we evaluate this situation? According to liberal egalitarian reasoning, the answer
depends on whether we view hours worked as something individuals are responsible
for. If hours worked is viewed a responsibility factor, then there is no reason to
worry at all. The liberal ideal that income inequalities due to responsibility factors
should be accepted, implies that the pre-tax income distribution in this situation is
fair and that there should be redistributive taxation.3
In contrast, the optimal welfaristic tax policy may have very different implica-
tions. In an interesting study Sandmo (1993) shows that utilitarianism may justify
redistribution from the ”energetic” to the ”lazy”, i.e. from those who have a low
marginal disutility of work towards those with a high disutility of work. The util-
itarian justification for this is easily seen if we assume that the marginal utility
of consumption is independent of how many hours a person works. In such situa-
tions, the sum of utility would be maximized by a tax policy that encouraged the
energetic to work more than those who are lazy and then transferred income from
3This is what refereed to as the laisser-faire criterion in Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006).
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the energetic to the lazy. We name this the ”exploitation of the energetic”. If we
believe that people should be held responsible for their preferences (or their choice
of hours worked when they face the same income opportunities), then such a con-
clusion should be considered a problem for utilitarian reasoning (see also Sandmo
(1993, p.162)).
To illustrate the second dilemma, consider the kind of situation analyzed by Mir-
rlees (1971), where all individuals have the same preferences, but differ in earning
capacity. In particular, let us consider a case where the Marshallian labor supply
is inelastic, such that all individuals make the same choice of labor effort, but face
different hourly wage rates. If we believe that people’s earnings capacity is largely
outside individual control and therefore should be viewed as a non-responsibility fac-
tor, a liberal egalitarian would object to such a situation on egalitarian grounds. The
income inequality is due to a non-responsibility factor and thus liberal egalitarians
would aim at equalizing incomes as much as possible in such a situation.4
Utilitarians may also endorse a redistribution from the more talented to the less
talented, but this would again depend on the properties of the individuals’ utility
function. Utilitarians would in this type of situation also be concerned with the level
of effort exercised by the different individuals. Specifically, utilitarians would aim at
having the more talented exercising more effort than the less talented, because this
would increase the total amount of utility in society. The more talented individuals,
because of the high alternative value of their leisure time, are less efficient ”utility
machines” than the less productive individuals. This is the well-known problem of
the ”slavery of the talented”.
In sum, utilitarianism and the standard welfarist framework more generally face
the problems of ”the exploitation of the energetic” and ”the slavery of the talented”,
which we believe shows that this framework violates basic moral intuitions in society.
Liberal egalitarianism, on the other hand, avoids both these conclusions, and more-
over presents a less instrumental justification of redistributive tax policies. Income
inequalities are seen as intrinsically justifiable if they reflect differences in respon-
4Fleurbaey and Maniquet (2006) formalizes this intuition as the transfer principle, which is
modified version of the Pigou-Dalton principle.
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sibility factors, and an equal income distribution is seen as intrinsically justifiable
if it reflects that the individuals differ in non-responsibility factors. Hence, in the
process of justification, no reference is made to other larger goals, like the total
amount of welfare in society, which income equalities or inequalities may or may not
contribute to.
4 Optimal tax policy
The welfarist framework has a simple solution to the optimal tax problem. To
achieve the first-best solution, the government should impose differentiated lump-
sum taxes. A lump-sum tax is a transfer that is independent of individual choices,
and by differentiating on individual characteristics, the government could achieve
whatever distribution of income that maximizes the social welfare distribution. Im-
portantly, such lump-sum transfers would not interfere with efficiency concerns, since
they do not change the marginal productivity of each individual.
A fundamental problem with lump-sum taxation is that the government typically
cannot observe each person’s talent directly (Stiglitz, 1987). Thus, the government
cannot introduce a differentiated lump-sum transfer from the more talented indi-
viduals to the less talented individuals. To introduce tests in order to reveal talent
would be self-defeating, since a person could pretend to be less talented than she
really is. Differentiated lump-sum transfers therefore do not represent a practically
feasible tax policy. But still, in theory, it represents the first-best ideal within a
welfarist framework.
In contrast, in a liberal egalitarian framework, differentiated lump-sum taxes are
insufficient in order to ensure a first-best income distribution. This follows from the
simple fact that equalization of income opportunities requires that everyone faces
the same opportunity set. A system of differentiated lump-sum taxes cannot achieve
this, since they are unable to change the marginal productivity of each individual.
This first-best analysis thus provides a nice illustration of an important distinc-
tion between standard welfarist and liberal egalitarian reasoning in redistributive
questions. The fact that the standard welfarist perspective focuses solely on differ-
7
ences in welfare, implies that the opportunity set offered to any individual only is
instrumental for giving this person a certain level of welfare (see also Sen, 1988).
Hence, the shape of the opportunity set offered to each individual is irrelevant. The
liberal egalitarian ideal, however, is concerned with equalizing opportunities, which
cannot be guaranteed by a set of differentiated lump-sum transfers.
This difference is also important in second-best analysis, where the tax system
has to rely only on income information. The standard welfarist framework views the
possibility of an efficiency loss as the only problem of progressive taxation, where the
efficiency loss is assumed to be traded-off against the gain of transferring resources
from people with low marginal welfare to people with high marginal welfare (possibly
discounting for differences in total welfare).
The liberal egalitarian approach, on the other hand, is concerned with two oppos-
ing effects of fairness in a progressive tax system. First, a progressive tax system may
reduce unfair inequalities between individuals who are identical with respect to their
responsibility factors; second, it may eliminate fair inequalities between individuals
who differ with respect to their responsibility factors. The first effect contributes
to reduced unfairness, whereas the second effect contributes to increased unfairness.
Hence, in the design of an optimal income tax system, a liberal egalitarian would
have to balance these two considerations.5
One might argue that the informational requirements of liberal egalitarian con-
siderations are too demanding, since individual information on responsibility factors
and non-responsibility factors typically is not available for the tax authorities. In
this respect, it is important to notice the difference between using such information
in the operation of a tax system and in the evaluation of a tax system (see also
Atkinson and Stiglitz (1980, p. 358). Even if information about individual effort
can not be used directly by the tax authorities, there is statistical information avail-
able that can be used in normative analysis of alternative tax systems. In the next
section we illustrate how this can be done in a study of the Norwegian tax system.
5A liberal egalitarian would further need to take into account the concern of Pareto-optimality
in the design of an optimal tax policy, as is carefully discussed in the chapter of Marc Fleurbaey
in this volume.
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5 Evaluating a tax system
There are three normative steps necessary when applying the liberal egalitarian ap-
proach to evaluate whether an income tax system contributes to a fairer distribution
of income in society. First, one need to determine where to draw the responsibility
cut, that is, what to include as responsibility factors and non-responsibility factors,
respectively. Second, one need to specify the specific liberal egalitarianism princi-
ple determining what is the fair distribution of income in any particular situation.
Third, one need to decide on how to aggregate individual deviations from the fair
distribution into a measure of overall unfairness in society. With this in place, one
can evaluate the tax system by simply comparing overall unfairness in the pre-tax
and post-tax income distribution.
In the following, we apply this framework to a study of the income tax system
in Norway in the period 1986-2005.6
5.1 The responsibility cut
Norwegian register data provide us with individual data on a number of dimensions
that may potentially affect an individual’s pre-tax income: hours worked, years
of education, whether one works in the private or public sector, gender, age, and
county of residence.7 The liberal egalitarian framework requires us to assign each of
these factors to the responsibility set or the non-responsibility set. If one assigns all
factors to the non-responsibility set, this framework collapses to strict egalitarianism
where all pre-tax inequalities are considered unfair. At the opposite extreme, if one
assigns all factors to the non-responsibility set, then it collapses to libertarianism
where the pre-tax income distribution is considered fair.
We would argue that the majority view in most societies is in between these
6This framework is developed with co-authors in (Alm˚as et al., 2011). Alternative approaches
also introducing the distinction between fair and unfair inequalities are given in Bourguignon, Fer-
reira, and Mene´ndez (2007), Devooght (2008), and Roemer, Aaberge, Colombino, Fritzell, Jenkins,
Marx, Page, Pommer, Ruiz-Castillo, San Segundo, Tranaes, Wagner, and Zurbiri (2003), where
our framework is closest to Devooght (2008).
7Our measure of pre-tax income is annual labor earnings. It includes all earnings from work
activities, but excludes pensions, transfers that are not direct replacements of labor income, and
any capital income. We deflate all the labor earnings to 1998 prices using the Consumer Price
Index constructed by Statistics Norway.
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two extreme positions, where one holds people responsible for some factors and
not responsible for others. Still it is a difficult task to pin down exactly where to
draw the responsibility cut in any particular society, and in Alm˚as et al. (2011) we
therefore highlight the importance of doing a robustness analysis with respect to the
responsible cut. In the main part of the analysis, we adopt what we consider the
majority view in Norway, where individuals are held responsible for hours worked,
years of education, whether they work in private or public sector, and county of
residence, but not for gender and age. We show, however, that our results are
robust to alternative plausible specifications of the responsibility cut.
In empirical analysis, observable factors can only explain a fraction of the overall
variation in pre-tax income, in the Norwegian case less than 50%, and thus a crucial
question is how to treat the unobservable factors. We argue that it follows from the
egalitarian part of liberal egalitarianism that unobservable factors should be treated
as non-responsibility factors, deviations from an equal distribution should only be
justified if individuals differ with respect to some observable responsibility factors.
Thus, in addition to age and gender, when calculating each individual’s fair income,
we do not hold people responsible for the unexplained part of their pre-tax income.
5.2 Calculating the fair income
Based on a specific responsibility cut and a liberal egalitarian fairness principle, in
our case the generalized proportionality principles, one can derive each individual’s
fair income from the estimated labor earnings equation. The estimated labor earn-
ings equation shows the extent to which each factor contributes to explaining the
pre-tax income, and thus one can calculate each individual’s fair income by treating
all individuals as if they are identical with respect to all non-responsibility factors
and only differ in their non-responsibility factors.
Applying this procedure to the Norwegian data, we show that individuals with
different responsibility vectors may have very different fair incomes. To illustrate, it
follows from the estimated labor earnings equation that the highest fair income in
2005 in Norway was close to five times as high as the lowest fair income. Overall,
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fair inequality, measured as the difference between the fair income distribution and
perfect equality, decreased slightly from 1986-2005. The standard Gini for the fair
income distribution fell from 0.176 in 1986 to 0.149 in 2005. Differences in hours
worked justify much of the fair inequality, but other responsibility factors also played
an important role. The labor earnings estimates for 2005 show that it may be fair
to give one person two and a half times more income than another who worked the
same number of hours if they differ maximally with respect to the other responsibility
factors.
The remaining step is now to develop an aggregate measure of how much the
pre-tax and post-tax income distributions differ from the fair income distribution.
5.3 Unfairness Gini
The standard Gini measure for income inequality measures how much the actual
income distribution in a situation deviates from a completely equal distribution of
the same total income. Our concern, however, is the distance between the actual
income distribution, pre-tax or post-tax, and the fair income distribution, and for
this we introduce the unfairness Gini.
To formalize the unfairness Gini, let a situation, A, contain a set of individuals,
N = {1, . . . , n}, where each individual, i, is characterized by the pair, (yAi , zAi ),
where yAi ≥ 0 is the actual income and zAi ≥ 0 is the fair income of individual i in
A. Hence, a situation A is characterized by A = [(yA1 , z
A
1 ), . . . , (y
A
n , z
A
n )], where the
average income is denoted as µ(A) = n−1
∑
i y
A
i .
In this framework, it can be shown that the unfairness Gini can be written as
Gu(A) =
2
n(n− 1)µ(A)
∑
i
iui(A). (3)
where ui(A) is how much person i’s actual income deviates from her fair income.
The standard Gini is given by the case where zAi = µ(A) for all individuals, but
the unfairness Gini allows for individual-specific fair incomes that, in the liberal
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egalitarian framework, reflect differences in observable responsibility factors.
5.4 Evaluating the tax system
By using the unfairness Gini, we can evaluate the performance of the income tax
system in Norway from 1986 to 2005.8 In particular, we can establish which of the
two opposing fairness effects are more important. Does the progressive Norwegian
income tax system primarily eliminate fair inequalities between people who are
similar on responsibility factors, or does it primarily eliminate unfair inequalities
reflecting differences in non-responsibility factors?
We observe from Figure 1 that the overall effect of the Norwegian income tax
system is a reduction in unfairness throughout the period. But the effect is larger
in 1986 than in 2005; the tax system reduces the unfairness Gini with 22.6% (from
0.204 to 0.158) in 1986 and with 16.6% in 2005 (from 0.220 to 0.184). Hence, the
tax reforms that have taken place in Norway between 1986 and 2005 seem to have
made the tax system less capable of reducing overall unfairness in society.
[Figure 1 about here.]
The figure also shows that there has been an increase in both pre-tax and post-tax
unfairness in Norway from 1986 to 2005: the pre-tax unfairness Gini has increased
from 0.204 to 0.220, and the post-tax income distribution has increased from 0.158
to 0.194. In contrast, the standard Gini shows reduced pre-tax inequality in this
period, but, in line with the unfairness Gini, increased post-tax inequality.
As we discuss in Alma˚s et al. (2011), there are two trends that explain most of
this development. First, in line with what has been observed for a number of other
countries in recent decades (Atkinson, Piketty, and Saez, 2010), there has been an
increase in top labor incomes in Norway; the pre-tax income share of the top per-
centile increased from 3.41% in 1986 to 4.87% in 2005. The concentration of income
at the top of the distribution increases both the standard Gini and the unfairness
Gini, and can, in fact, account for almost all of the increase in the unfairness Gini.
8Details of this analysis can be found in Alm˚as et al. (2011).
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Second, we observe important changes in the situation of females in the period,
and as a result the average pre-tax income of females is much closer to the average
pre-tax income in society in 2005 than in 1986. These changes, however, do not
bring females much closer to their fair income, since the increase in working hours
and education among females also translates into an increase in females’ fair income
of almost the same size as their increase in pre-tax income. Thus, the increased role
of females in the labor market impacts the standard Gini and the unfairness Gini
differently. It causes a substantial decrease in the standard Gini that contributes to
outweigh the effect of the increase in top pre-tax incomes, whereas it has almost no
impact on the unfairness Gini. As a result, the development of the two measures
diverge for the pre-tax distribution, where we observe an increase in the unfairness
Gini and a reduction in the standard Gini.
6 Concluding remarks
In this paper we have argued that a liberal egalitarian approach to tax policy re-
spects some fundamental intuitions about personal responsibility and the need to
distinguish between different types of inequality. As a result, it avoids two funda-
mental challenges to the standard welfarist approach to tax policy: the ”exploitation
of the energetic” and the ”exploitation of the talented”.
The liberal egalitarian approach also highlights that a progressive income tax
system may have two opposing effects on fairness. It may increase the level of
unfairness in society by eliminating fair inequalities reflecting differences in respon-
sibility factors, but it may also reduce the level of unfairness in society by eliminating
unfair inequalities reflecting differences in non-responsibility factors. We illustrate,
by using Norwegian data, how one empirically can investigate which effect is more
important, by using the unfairness Gini to study whether the level of fairness is
lower in the post-tax income distribution than in the pre-tax income distribution.
The use of the liberal egalitarian framework can be extended in a number of
directions. First, our empirical approach can be generalized to cover more robust
tax policy comparisons not only relying on an unfairness Gini, but more generally on
13
the comparison of unfairness Lorenz curves. Second, it can be extended theoretically,
as shown in Fleurbaey (2008), to ensure that it also can be combined with a concern
for Pareto optimality in the design of redistributive tax systems. Thus, we believe
that the liberal egalitarian approach represents a promising and plausible normative
foundation for modern tax debates that respect fundamental principle prevalent in
most modern societies.
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Figure 1: Unfairness and inequality over time. The figure (which is identical
to Figure 4 in Alma˚s et al. (2011)), shows the development of the standard Gini
and the unfairness Gini in the period 1986 - 2005. The estimates of fair income are
based on the responsibility set containing hours worked, years of education, sector
(public versus private), and county of residence.
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